OVERVIEW

The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) outlines the standards for sex offender registration and notification.[1] SORNA both imposes federal registration obligations and provides minimum national standards for other jurisdictions to incorporate. It was enacted in 2006 as part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act. It has since been modified by the Keeping the Internet Devoid of Predators Act (KIDS Act) in 2008, the Military Sex Offender Reporting Act in 2015, and International Megan’s Law in 2016. The Department of Justice (DOJ) also published a series of regulations regarding SORNA, the latest of which being the “Registration Requirements Under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act” in 2022.

A sex offender is an individual who was convicted of a sex offense.[2] “Sex offense” includes a criminal offense that has an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another and a criminal offense that is a specified offense against a minor.[3] “Specified offense against a minor” includes: the possession, production, or distribution of child pornography; criminal sexual conduct involving a minor or the use of the Internet to facilitate or attempt such conduct; and any conduct that “by its nature” is a sex offense against a minor.[4] “Conviction” applies to any sex offender who has “been subject to penal consequences based on the conviction, however it may be styled,” regardless of whether or not their record has been sealed.[5]

Furthermore, SORNA requires people who are convicted of certain military offenses (Uniform Code of Military Justice offenses listed in Department of Defense Instruction 1325.07) to register as sex offenders. Juveniles who have been adjudicated delinquent of serious sex offenses (committing/attempting/conspiring to commit a sexual act with another by force or threat of serious violence or by rendering the victim unconscious or involuntarily drugging the victim) or who are prosecuted as adults are also required to register as sex offenders. States may differ in their registration requirements for juvenile sex offenders.

[1] SMART Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking, Current Law: SORNA, https://smart.ojp.gov/sorna/current-law

[2] 34 U.S.C. § 20911(1)

[3] 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)

[4] 34 U.S.C. § 20911(7)

[5] SMART Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking, Current Law: SORNA, https://smart.ojp.gov/sorna/current-law

OFFENDER CATEGORIES

Under SORNA, sex offenders are classified into tiers based on the nature and seriousness of their offenses, the victim’s age, and the offender’s prior sex offense convictions. Tiers affect how long the offender must continue to register under SORNA, as well as how frequently they must report. Jurisdictions may place offenders into tiers based on the elements of the offense, and “are not required to look to underlying conduct that is not reflected in the offense of conviction.”[6] However, tier classifications that depend on the victim’s age must be followed, even for crimes for which the elements do not specify that the victim must be below the threshold age if the victim was actually below it.

[6] The National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 73 Fed. Reg. 38030, 38053 (effective July 2, 2008)

LOCATIONS

The Attorney General has clarified that SORNA establishes minimum national standards, allowing jurisdictions to “adopt requirements that encompass the SORNA baseline of sex offender registration and notification requirements but exceed them” in relation to specific aspects of registration.[7] While other jurisdictions are not technically required to enforce SORNA’s obligations, they risk a reduction of Federal funding should they fail to do so.[8]

SORNA requires sex offenders to maintain current registration in each jurisdiction where they live, are employed, or are a student. They must also register in the jurisdiction in which they were convicted should it differ from that of their residence.[9] Homeless and transient sex offenders are also required to register under SORNA, and “reside” in a jurisdiction when they either have a home in or habitually reside in the jurisdiction. Jurisdictions are also free to determine who resides within them for registration purposes.[10]

Federal jurisdiction extends to sex offenders convicted under federal law, D.C. law, Indian tribal law, or U.S. territory law, as well as to those who engage in interstate or international travel, or enter, leave, or reside in Indian country.[11]

[7] 73 Fed. Reg. at 38032

[8] Registration Requirements Under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 86 Fed. Reg. 69857 (effective December 8, 2021)

[9] 86 Fed. Reg. at 69885

[10] 73 Fed. Reg. at 38050-38052

[11] 86 Fed. Reg. at 69886

REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS

People are required to first register either before release from imprisonment or, if not sentenced to prison, within three business days of sentencing.[12]

The types of information sex offenders are generally required to register include their:[13]

1. Name (including any alias), birth date (including any purported date of births), and Social Security Number (including any purported SSNs)
2. Remote communication identifiers (i.e. email addresses and telephone numbers)[14]
3. Information about places of residence, non-residential lodging (when away from residence for seven or more days), employment (name, address, and other information), and school attendance
4. International travel (at least 21 days in advance)
5. Passports and immigration documents (passports of all types and nationalities)
6. Vehicle information (used for personal and employment purposes)
7. Professional licenses

In terms of keeping registration current, SORNA generally requires:[15]

1. Initial registration before release from imprisonment (or within three business days after sentencing if not imprisoned)
2. Periodic in-person appearances to verify/update registration information
   1. At least each year (tier I), every six months (tier II), or every three months (tier III)
3. Reporting of name, residence, employment, or school changes
   1. In-person, within three business days[16]
4. Reporting of intended change in residence, employment, or school
5. Reporting of changes to remote communication identifiers, temporary lodging information, and vehicle information
   1. Within three business days
6. Reporting of international travel
   1. At least 21 days in advance of intended travel
   2. Exceptions made in cases of unanticipated emergencies[17]
7. Compliance with jurisdiction rules

The federal government does not maintain its own registration system and instead relies on those established under state laws to collect required information. Thus, it is imperative that people are made aware when their state registration requirements do not mirror SORNA so that they do not unintentionally violate SORNA’s registration requirements.[18] A person can still violate federal criminal law by not following SORNA’s obligations, even if they have complied with their state’s registration requirements.

[12] 34 U.S.C. 20913(b)

[13] 86 Fed. Reg. at 69885

[14] In 2008, the Keeping the Internet Devoid of Predators Act (KIDS Act) amended SORNA to require jurisdictions to collect sex offenders’ internet identifiers in the registration process (but does not require them to be posted to the jurisdiction’s public sex offender registry website).

[15] 86 Fed. Reg. at 69885

[16] 24 U.S.C. 20913(c)

[17] 86 Fed. Reg. at 69883

[18] The Sex Offense Litigation and Policy Resource Center (SOLPRC) at Mitchell Hamline School of Law. SORNA 2022: A Guide for Practitioners to New Federal SORNA Regulations Effective January 7, 2022 (2022)

LENGTH OF REGISTRATION

The length that a sex offender must continue to register under SORNA depends on the tier under which they are classified. Generally, the length is 15 years for a tier I sex offender, 25 years for a tier II sex offender, and life for a tier III sex offender.[19]

However, “when the sex offender is in custody or civilly committed,” they are not required to register under SORNA because they are not at risk of reoffending in the community.[20] However, jurisdictions are free to require offenders to maintain updated registrations even during incarceration. The registration period under SORNA thus begins either upon the release from imprisonment following a sex offense conviction, or when not sentenced to prison, at the time of sentencing. If a sex offender is serving additional time for a non-sex offense charge, the registration period begins upon completion of the total prison sentence. Under SORNA, if a registered sex offender is later incarcerated for a different offense during their registration period, that time still counts toward the total registration requirement, but jurisdictions are nonetheless free to exclude that period of time from the total length of registration.

Some sex offenders may receive a reduction in the length of their required registration period for a “clean record,” meaning that they are not convicted of any felony or sex offense, successfully complete any period of supervision, and successfully complete an appropriate sex offender treatment program.[21] In this case, a tier I sex offender who maintains a clean record for 10 years receives a 5 year reduction, and a tier III sex offender required to register on the basis of a juvenile delinquency adjudication who maintains a clean record for 25 years receives a reduction to the period for which the clean record is maintained.

However, not all states have substantially implemented SORNA,[22] and the length of registration period is determined by state law. For current information on the duration of registration requirement for each U.S. State, the Restoration of Rights Project has compiled a 50-state comparison of relief from sex offense registration obligations: https://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/50-state-comparison-relief-from-sex-offender-registration-obligations/

[19] 86 Fed. Reg. at 69885

[20] Id.

[21] Id.

[22] See States: Variability from SORNA below

REMOVAL FROM THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY

Because states are ultimately responsible for collecting and reporting sex offender registry information, as well as determining length of registration, they are also in control of removing offenders from the list. In some states, offenders can never have their names removed from the list. In others, based on state law and type of offense, offenders are able to remove their names from the list. The process usually involves petitioning to the state government, which involves filing fees and potential legal fees.[23] Factors that may impact the ability to be removed from the registry in each state may include the age at which one committed the offense, the severity of the offense, the likelihood of sex offense recidivism, the length of the required waiting period after serving the sentence or parole, whether the conviction was revoked or pardoned, existing criminal record, and out-of-state convictions.[24]

For example, California began allowing certain offenders to remove their names from the registry in 2021. The process involves filing a petition with the superior court in their county of residence. However, those who are deemed a Tier 3 sex offender by the state (the result of a conviction of felony possession of child pornography) are required to remain on the registry forever, and cannot petition for removal.[25]

For another example, in Virginia, offenders who are registered for a single Tier I offense can remove their names from the registry after 15 years by completing all court-ordered treatment, counseling, and restitution payment in addition to demonstrating to the court that they are no longer a risk to public safety. Those convicted for a single Tier II offense (such as distribution of child pornography) can do the same after 25 years. Those convicted of two or more offenses for which registration is required, murder, or a sexually violent offense cannot petition for removal.[26] To remove their information from the registry, offenders must file a petition and then wait for the court review of their criminal history, records of the sex offense, and registration history. Then, prosecutors have the opportunity to challenge the removal of their name from the list, which involves a removal hearing in which the state bears the burden of proving that the offender is still a danger. The judge ultimately decides whether the offender’s name and information can be removed from the registry, in which case one might have to ask local law enforcement to do so. In the event that the petition for removal is denied, one must wait at least 2 years before filing a new petition.[27]

For current information on whether the offense can be removed and whether the offender is eligible for removal for each U.S. State, the Restoration of Rights Project has compiled a 50-state comparison of relief from sex offense registration obligations: https://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/50-state-comparison-relief-from-sex-offender-registration-obligations/

Furthermore, it bears noting that even if a person is removed from the registry, the crime will still appear on their criminal record. Crimes involving sexual activity with a minor, felonies, and violent acts can never be expunged. Some states even prohibit all sex crime convictions from being eligible for expungement.

The process of removing a person’s name from a state’s sex offender registry does not automatically result in the removal of their information from the national sex offender registry. State and national registries operate independently, and removal from one does not guarantee removal from the other. The national registry aggregates information from state registries, but ultimately maintains its own database. Therefore, if a person is eligible, removal from both might require separate processes. If a person no longer has to register with their state registry, they might still be required to register under SORNA. Furthermore, jurisdictions vary in whether or not a person’s name is removed from the registry once they are no longer required to register. SORNA does not require a jurisdiction to remove an offender from the registry once they are no longer required to register in that particular jurisdiction.[28] There is a chance their names remain but with a notation indicating that they are no longer obligated to register.

[23] LawInfo, & Devendorf, J. (2024, March 12). Can I Get My Name Removed from the Sex Offender Registry? LawInfo. https://www.lawinfo.com/resources/sex-crime/sex-offender-registry-can-get-my-name-removed.html

[24] Lotze Mosley PLLC. (2024b, January 4). How Do You Petition the Court for Removal from the Registry? https://lotzemosley.com/sex-crime-defense-attorney-washington-dc/how-do-you-petition-the-court-for-removal-from-the-sex-offender-registry/#

[25] Armstrong, K. (2023, August 30). Can you terminate your sex offender registration in California? – Law Offices of Kerry L. Armstrong, APLC. Law Offices of Kerry L. Armstrong, APLC.https://sddefenseattorneys.com/blog/california-sex-offender-registry/

[26] Code of Virginia § 9.1-910. Removal of name and information from Registry

[27] Sex Offender registry removal | Roanoke Criminal Attorneys. (2023, August 9). Roanoke Criminal Attorneys.https://www.roanokecriminalattorney.com/practice-areas/sex-crimes/sex-offender-registry-removal/#:~:text=Virginia%20Code%20%C2%A79.1%2D910,a%20risk%20to%20public%20safety

[28] Implementation documents: SORNA: Clarification of registration jurisdictional issues, Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking, https://smart.ojp.gov/sorna/current-law/implementation-documents/clarification-registration-jurisdictional-issues

PUBLIC REGISTRY WEBSITE REQUIREMENTS

SORNA requires every jurisdiction to maintain a public sex offender registry website that contains specific information for each listed offender. Jurisdictions must also participate in the Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender Public Website (NSOPW), which was created by the DOJ in 2005 and is maintained by the SMART Office. SORNA does not require jurisdictions to disclose information about juveniles adjudicated delinquent on their public registry websites. If a jurisdiction does not require a certain type of offender to be posted to their public registry website, the offender will not appear on NSOPW.

Under SORNA, only Tier I offenders may be exempt from public disclosure except for those convicted of a “specified offense against a minor,” such as child pornography offenses.

[29]34 U.S.C. § 20920

FAILURE TO REGISTER / LIABILITY

Federal law, and most state laws, make it a crime for sex offenders to fail to register or update their registration as required by SORNA. Thus, “individuals may be prosecuted for a failure to comply with SORNA’s requirements under 18 U.S.C. § 2250 where that failure was knowing, and the individual was subject to federal jurisdiction.”[30] Under federal law, knowing failure to register or update registration as required by SORNA could result in imprisonment for up to 10 years.[31] However, for a federal failure-to-register offense to apply, there must be “circumstances supporting federal jurisdiction… such as interstate or international travel by a sex offender, or conviction of a federal sex offense for which registration is required.”[32] In other words, SORNA makes it a federal crime when a sex offender fails to register and then travels outside their state. Because SORNA’s requirements are independent of state law requirements, noncompliance could result in prosecution for both a federal offense and a state offense. Further, “because noncompliant states do not match Federal SORNA’s exact registration requirements, if an individual is subject to federal jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 2250, they could be held liable for failing to comply with Federal SORNA while fully complying with state law.”[33]

In one notable case, a group of people from California were adjudicated and no longer required to register as sex offenders under state law. However, because SORNA requires all sex offenders to register certain information under SORNA, including subsets of people who are no longer required to register under their state laws, the federal government moved to prosecute the people from California (despite California not even collecting the information SORNA requires, even for currently registered sex offenders). The DOJ maintained that even though the people could not register this information in California, they still legally had to register under SORNA, and gave them the burden of proving that they were unable to register. A federal judge in California found that this part of SORNA’s requirements is unconstitutional because it requires people to prove their innocence rather than the government prove their guilt. While this ruling only applies to one district, it might inspire other districts to similarly challenge the prosecution of people for a law that they are incapable of complying with.[34]

“Knowingly” ensures that people are not held liable for violations of registration requirements that they did not know about. However, “this does not require knowledge that the requirement is imposed by SORNA.”[35] For example, if an offender knowingly violates one of their state’s registration requirements, but does not know that the same requirement is also mandated by SORNA, they are still liable. Some jurisdictions treat failure to register as a strict liability offense, which does not require proof of criminal intent.

Jurisdictions are required to notify sex offenders of their duty to register before they can be held liable for failure to register.[36]

Violation of SORNA’s international travel reporting requirement includes both knowingly failing to provide information relating to actual international travel and knowingly failing to provide information related to intended travel which is not carried out.[37]

The 2021 Rule outlines an affirmative defense. If uncontrollable circumstances prevent an offender from complying with SORNA (i.e. a registration jurisdiction fails to accept or include their information in the sex offender registry), and they then complied as soon as they were able, they are not liable under 18 U.S.C. 2250.

[30] The Sex Offense Litigation and Policy Resource Center (SOLPRC) at Mitchell Hamline School of Law. SORNA 2022: A Guide for Practitioners to New Federal SORNA Regulations Effective January 7, 2022 (2022)

[31] 18 U.S.C. 2250(a)

[32] 18 U.S.C. 2250 § 141(a)

[33] The Sex Offense Litigation and Policy Resource Center (SOLPRC) at Mitchell Hamline School of Law. SORNA 2022: A Guide for Practitioners to New Federal SORNA Regulations Effective January 7, 2022 (2022)

[34] https://mitchellhamline.edu/sex-offense-litigation-policy/2022/05/03/solprcs-guide-for-practitioners-to-new-federal-sorna-regulations-effective-january-7-2022/

[35] 86 Fed. Reg. at 69886

[36] U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking. Sex Offender Registration and Notification in the United States: Case Law Summary (2023)

[37] 86 Fed. Reg. at 69886; 18 U.S.C. 2250(b)

CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES

Because people are required to register as sex offenders after they are convicted, they have already received a number of constitutional protections.[40] However, it is still possible to raise constitutional or other legal challenges to sex offender registration requirements.

All Circuits to have ruled on the matter have held that SORNA is constitutional under the Commerce Clause.[41] The Supreme Court has held that the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the power to enact SORNA and to apply its registration requirements to federal offenders who completed their sentences before SORNA’s enactment.[42] The Tenth Circuit and the Eastern District of New York have held that the application of state sex offender registration laws do not conflict with SORNA in violation of the Supremacy Clause.[43]

A few district courts have held that the application of SORNA does not violate the Bill of Attainder Clause, either because sex offender registration is not punitive and offenders have already been granted a trial.[44] Maine’s district court found that retroactive application of their Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act’s registration requirements without a judicial trial was punitive and therefore was an unconstitutional bill of attainder in violation of the Maine Constitution.[45]

When an offender moves to another jurisdiction and is required to register there, even though their duty to register in the original jurisdiction has been terminated, arguments based on the Full Faith and Credit Clause often arise. The Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits and Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New York, and North Dakota Courts have held that enforcing SORNA does not violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause under such circumstances.[46]

Challenges to SORNA on the basis of interference with the right to interstate travel are typically unsuccessful.[47] Similarly, arguments that state registration requirements violate the separation of powers or are an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power are typically unsuccessful.[48]

Ex Post Facto challenges most commonly arise when a person who was convicted of a sex crime prior to SORNA’s enactment is required to register, when a jurisdiction makes changes to its sex offender registration requirements after a person has been sentenced, when a person’s classification is changed, or when a person’s information is made publicly available on a jurisdiction’s public registry. Every Circuit except the Federal Circuit has held that state registration and notification requirements and sex offender registration under SORNA are non punitive or a collateral consequence of conviction.[49] However, some district courts have held that state registration and notification requirements constitute punishment, thus affecting the protection of the Ex Post Facto Clause for retroactive applications of SORNA’s registration requirements.[50] All of the Circuits except for the D.C. and Federal Circuit (which have not addressed the matter) have held that the federal version of SORNA does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.[51] The retroactive application of state sex offender registration is more controversial. Alaska, New York, Texas, Tennessee, Indiana, Wisconsin, Nebraska, Idaho, Oklahoma, California, Nevada, Colorado, New Mexico, Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, D.C., Illinois, Michigan, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Missouri, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, and Wyoming’s state laws have all been determined to not violate state or federal ex post facto prohibitions.[52] However, Michigan, Tennessee, Nebraska, Nevada, Alabama, Alaska, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania, have in certain instances held that retroactive application of their state’s sex offender registration and notification laws violate either the state’s constitution or the United States Constitution.[53] Maryland is undecided on whether sex offender registration is a “direct” rather than “collateral” consequence of conviction.[54]

Debate about the implications of First Amendment rights on sex offender registration includes considerations of whether internet and social media restrictions (the Supreme Court found a sweeping statute restricting social media membership unconstitutional, but some Circuit courts draw distinctions from this case)[55], the collection of internet identifiers and other personal information (statutes generally must be narrow enough to accomplish the government’s interests, otherwise they risk being unconstitutional)[56], limitations on name changes (generally constitutional)[57], requiring sex offender identification on licenses (generally constitutional)[58], and requiring the posting of signs announcing sex offender status (generally constitutional)[59]. Attempts to challenge SORNA for compelling speech in the form of registration information have been unsuccessful.[60]

Attempts to challenge home visits, collection of internet identifiers, DNA, and other registry information under the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures have been unsuccessful.[61] Fourth Amendment challenges regarding the imposition of GPS or satellite-based monitoring are more controversial.[62]

Claims alleging violation of defendants’ Fifth Amendment rights to be free from self-incrimination, double jeopardy, and those based on the Takings Clause are usually unsuccessful.[63]

Offenders have alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment in cases where attorneys did not advise them that a conviction would require sex offender registration, encouraged guilty pleas without notice of sex offender registration requirements, or misrepresented or incorrectly stated their duty to register.[64] However, the Sixth Amendment does not require attorneys to inform their clients of the collateral consequences of a conviction.[65] The Supreme Court held in Apprendi v. New Jersey that “other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”[66] Therefore, offenders have argued that a jury must determine whether or not they should be required to register as sex offenders because registration is punitive.[67]

Offenders also (usually unsuccessfully) challenge sex offender registration requirements under the Eighth Amendment by alleging that requiring registration constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.[68]

Challenges that the enforcement of SORNA violates the Tenth Amendment because it forces states to register sex offenders under SORNA have also failed because states are not technically required to substantially implement SORNA (failure to comply only results in a reduction in federal funding), and the burden of registering with SORNA rests solely on the individual offender.[69]

Challenges that sex offender laws violate the Fourth Amendment’s protection of an individual’s right to due process have targeted the offender’s requirement to register,[70] the offender’s classification or tier,[71] public notification requirements,[72] determinations as to what constitutes a “sex offense,”[73] being labeled as a sex offender or inherently dangerous offender,[74] and being required to register as a condition of parole or supervised release, with mixed success. Massachusetts and Alaska both require due process hearings before an offender is required to register as a sex offender. The Fourteenth Amendment also guarantees equal protection of the laws, leading to challenges when sex offender registration statuses treat similarly situated people differently.[75]

[40] Case Law Summary: III. Legal Challenges/Issues, Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking (2023), https://smart.ojp.gov/sorna/current-law/case-law/iii-legal-challengesissues.

[41] United States v. Robbins, 729 F.3d 131, 136 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. Guzman, 591 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 561 U.S. 1019 (2010); United States v. Pendleton, 636 F.3d 78, 88 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912, 920 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Lusby, No. 21-10333, 2022 WL 16570816, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 1, 2022); United States v. Cabrera-Gutierrez, 756 F.3d 1125, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. White, 782 F.3d 1118, 1123 (10th Cir. 2015); United States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202, 1211 (11th Cir. 2009)

[42] United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387, 399 (2013)

[43] United States v. King, 431 F. App’x 630, 633 (10th Cir. 2011)

[44] Orfield v. Virginia, No. 12CV541, 2012 WL 3561920, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 16, 2012); Pearson v. Holder, No. 09-cv-00682, 2011 WL 13185719, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 2011); Nguyen v. Evans, No. A21-1319, 2022 WL 1210277, at *9-10 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2022)

[45] Doe XLVI v. Anderson, 108 A.3d 378, 387-88 (Me. 2015)

[46] United States v. Paul, 718 F. App’x 360, 364 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 342 (2019); Rosin v. Monken, 599 F.3d at 576-77 (7th Cir. 2010); Lindsey v. Comm’r of Fla. Dep’t of Law Enf’t, No. 22-10420, 2022 WL 4231823, at *3 (11th Cir. Sept. 14, 2022)

[47] United States v. Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 158-159 (3d Cir. 2010); Prynne v. Settle, 848 F. App’x 104 (4th Cir. 2021); Doe v. Jindal, No. 15-1283 SECTION R(2), 2015 WL 7300506, at *9 (E.D. La. Nov. 18, 2015); United States v. Byrd, 419 F. App’x 485, 491 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500); Hope v. Comm’r of Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 9 F.4th 513, 523 (7th Cir. 2021); McGuire v. Marshall, 512 F. Supp. 3d 1189, 1229 (M.D. Ala. 2021); United States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202, 1210 (11th Cir. 2009); Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1345-46 (11th Cir. 2005); State v. Yeoman, 236 P.3d 1265, 1269 (Idaho 2010); State v. Smith, 344 P.3d 1244, 1249 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015)

[48] Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2121 (2019); Cole v. United States, 823 F. App’x 911 (11th Cir. 2020); United States v. Mingo, 964 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 2020); United States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912, 920 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Zeroni, 799 F. App’x 950, 951 (8th Cir. 2020); United States v. Kuehl, 706 F.3d 917, 920 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2009)

[49] Anderson v. Holder, 647 F.3d 1165, 1169-73 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Thomas v. United States, 942 A.2d 1180, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Doe v. Cuomo, 755 F.3d 105, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2014); Burr v. Snider, 234 F.3d 1052, 1054 (8th Cir. 2000); Shaw v. Patton, 823 F.3d 556, 577 (10th Cir. 2016); Ridley v. Caldwell, No. 21-13504, 2022 WL 2800203 (11th Cir. July 18, 2022); United States v. Parks, 698 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 2012); United States v. Diaz, 967 F.3d 107, 109-10 (2d Cir. 2020); United States v. Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151, 158-159 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Under Seal, 709 F.3d 257, 266 (4th Cir. 2013); United States v. Young, 585 F.3d 199, 206 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Felts, 674 F.3d 599, 606 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Leach, 639 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912, 919-920 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Elk Shoulder, 738 F.3d 948, 954 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v. W.B.H., 664 F.3d 848, 851 (11th Cir. 2011)

[50] See [20]

[51] United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387, 389 (2013); United States v. Parks, 698 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 2012); United States v. DiTomasso, 621 F.3d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v. Brunner, 726 F.3d 299, 304 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. Guzman, 591 F.3d 83, 94 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 561 U.S. 1019 (2010); United States v. Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 158-159 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 466 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912, 917-18 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Young, 585 F.3d 199, 203-206 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Felts, 674 F.3d 599, 606 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Leach, 639 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912, 919-920 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Elk Shoulder, 738 F.3d 953-54 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Elkins, 683 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. White, 782 F.3d 1118, 1133-35 (10th Cir. 2015); United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 938 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Lawrance, 548 F.3d 1329, 1335 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. W.B.H., 664 F.3d 851 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202, 1207 (11th Cir. 2009)

[52] Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105-06 (2003); Doe v. Cuomo, 755 F.3d 105, 110 (2d Cir. 2014); Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1285 (2d Cir. 1997); Does 1-7 v. Abbott, 945 F.3d 307, 313 (5th Cir. 2019); King v. McCraw, 559 F. App’x 278, 280-81 (5th Cir. 2014); Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1000 (6th Cir. 2007); Hope v. Comm’r of Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 9 F.4th 513, 534 (7th Cir. 2021); Mueller v. Raemisch, 740 F.3d 1128, 1133 (7th Cir. 2014); Does 1-134 v. Wasden, 982 F.3d 784, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2020); Shaw v. Patton, 823 F.3d 556, 577 (10th Cir. 2016); Litmon v. Harris, 768 F.3d 1237, 1243 (9th Cir. 2014); ACLU of Nev. v. Masto, 670 F.3d 1046, 1053 (9th Cir. 2012); Hatton v. Bonner, 356 F.3d 955, 967 (9th Cir. 2004); Herrera v. Williams, 99 F. App’x 188, 190 (10th Cir. 2004); Windwalker v. Governor of Ala., 579 F. App’x 769, 919-920 (11th Cir. 2014)

[53] Does #1-5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 705-06 (6th Cir. 2016); McGuire v. Strange, 50 F.4th 986, 1020-21 (11th Cir. 2022)

[54] Hyman v. State, 208 A.3d 807, 820 (Md. 2019)

[55] Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017); United States v. Leone, 813 F. App’x 665, 669-70 (2d Cir. 2020); Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion County, Ind., 705 F.3d 694, 697-98 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Crume, 422 F.3d 728, 733 (8th Cir. 2005)

[56] Cornelio v. Connecticut, 32 F.4th 160 (2d Cir. 2022); Doe v. Shurtleff, 628 F.3d 1217, 1224-26 (10th Cir. 2010); Willman v. Att’y Gen. of United States, 972 F.3d 819, 825 (6th Cir. 2020); Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 480 (6th Cir. 1999)

[57] Krebs v. Graveley, 861 F. App’x 671, 673 (7th Cir. 2021)

[58] Doe 1 v. Marshall, 367 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1327 (M.D. Ala. 2019); State v. Hill, 341 So. 3d 539, 542 (La. 2020)

[59] McClendon v. Long, 22 F.4th 1330, 1340-41 (11th Cir. 2022)

[60] United States v. Arnold, 740 F.3d 1032, 1035 (5th Cir. 2014)

[61] Jones v. County of Suffolk, 936 F.3d 108, 119 (2d Cir. 2019); Doe v. Shurtleff, 628 F.3d 1217, 1226-27 (10th Cir. 2010); Johnson v. Terhune, 184 F. App’x 622, 624-25 (9th Cir. 2006)

[62] Doe v. Nebraska, 898 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1127 (D. Neb. 2012); Commonwealth v. Roderick, 194 N.E.3d 197, 210-11 (Mass. 2022); Commonwealth v. Feliz, 119 N.E.3d 700 (Mass. 2019); H.R. v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 231 A.3d 617, 620 (N.J. 2020); State v. Hilton, 862 S.E.2d 806, 820 (N.C. 2021); State v. Strudwick, 864 S.E.2d 231, 234-35 (N.C. 2021); State v. Reed, 863 S.E.2d 820 (N.C. Ct. App. 2021); State v. Grady, 831 S.E.2d 542, 544-45 (N.C. 2019); State v. Lindquist, 847 S.E.2d 78, 80-81 (N.C. Ct. App. 2020)

[63] McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 30-31 (2002); Melnick v. Camper, 487 F. Supp. 3d at 1054; United States v. Peters, 856 F. App’x 230, 235 (11th Cir. 2021); United States v. Diaz, 967 F.3d 107, 109-11 (2d Cir. 2020) (per curiam); Artway v. Att’y Gen. of N.J., 81 F.3d 1235, 1267 (3d Cir. 1996); Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 474–76 (6th Cir. 1999); Steward v. Folz, 190 F. App’x 476, 479 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Fisher, No. 21-1590, 2022 WL 468520 (8th Cir. Feb. 16, 2022) (per curiam); United States v. Lusby, 972 F.3d 1032, 1038 (9th Cir. 2020)

[64] Scott v. Fox, No. 18-cv-2687 P, 2020 WL 3571476, at *9 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2020); Saylor v. Nagy, No. 20-1834, 2021 WL 5356030, at *4 (6th Cir. Nov. 17, 2021); United States v. Cottle, 355 F. App’x 18, 21 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Shepherd, 880 F.3d 734, 741-42 (5th Cir. 2018)

[65] Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 349 & n.5 (2013) (citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 375-76 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment))

[66] Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)

[67] United States v. Beck, 957 F.3d 440, 445-46 (4th Cir. 2020); United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2378, 2384 (2019); Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 111, 114 (2013)

[68] United States v. Diaz, 967 F.3d 107, 109-10 (2d Cir. 2020) (per curiam); Dongarra v. Smith, 27 F.4th 174 (3d Cir. 2022); Doe v. Settle, 24 F.4th 932, 946 (4th Cir. 2022); Gonzalez v. Duncan, 551 F.3d 875, 889 (9th Cir. 2008); Millard v. Camper, 971 F.3d 1174, 1181 (10th Cir. 2020)

[69] Thomas v. Blocker, No. 21-1943, 2022 WL 2870151 (3d Cir. July 21, 2022); Kennedy v. Allera, 612 F.3d 261, 269 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912, 920 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Felts, 674 F.3d 599, 607-08 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Smith, 504 F. App’x 519, 520 (8th Cir. 2012) (per curiam); United States v. Richardson, 754 F.3d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Neel, 641 F. App’x 782, 793 (10th Cir. 2016); United States v. White, 782 F.3d 1118, 1128 (10th Cir. 2015)

[70] Pierre v. Vasquez, No. 20-51032, 2022 WL 68970, at *3 (5th Cir. Jan. 6, 2022)

[71] Doe v. Settle, 24 F.4th 932, 953 (4th Cir. 2022); Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d 392, 401-02 (5th Cir. 2010); Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1168 (10th Cir. 2011); Gwinn v. Awmiller, 354 F.3d 1211, 1218-19 (10th Cir. 2004)

[72] Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2003)

[73] Doe (No. 339940) v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 170 N.E.3d 1143, 1154 (Mass. 2021); Meredith v. Stein, 355 F. Supp. 3d 355, 165-66 (E.D.N.C. 2018), superseded by statute, N.C. Stat. § 14-208.6, as recognized in Grabarczyk v. Stein, No. 21-CV-94, 2021 WL 5810501 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 7, 2021)

[74] Kreilein v. Horth, 854 F. App’x 733, 734-35 (7th Cir. 2021); ACLU of Nev. v. Masto, 670 F.3d 1046, 1053 (9th Cir. 2012); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 830 (9th Cir. 1997); Kirby v. Siegelman, 195 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 1999); Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 643-44 (8th Cir. 2003)

[75] Doe v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 513 F.3d 95, 112 (3d Cir. 2008); Hope v. Comm’r of Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.4th 647 (7th Cir. 2023); Carney v. Okla. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 875 F.3d 1347, 1352-53 (10th Cir. 2017)

OTHER LEGAL ISSUES

A variety of other legal issues often arise. Information on the following topics can be found here: https://smart.ojp.gov/sorna/current-law/case-law/iii-legal-challengesissues#c-other-legal-issues

• Administrative Procedure Act
• Americans with Disabilities Act
• Child Custody
• Civil Commitment
• Conditions of Supervised Release & United States v. Haymond
• Defamation
• Fair Credit Reporting Act
• Firearms
• Habeas Corpus / Post-Conviction Relief–State Custody (28 U.S.C. § 2254) & “In Custody”
• Housing
• Immigration & Deportation
• Sentencing Enhancement Under Federal Law (18 U.S.C. § 2260A)